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Introduction: 
Spinoza’s understanding of the relation between “the imagination” and the mind’s higher 
rational capacities is fraught with tension. In fact, he does not seem to have settled his 
mind on whether the imagination conflicts with reason or whether it supports intellectual 
endeavors, and if so, how. Nonetheless, on at least one promising academic interpretation 
of his work, we may say that one of reason’s functions is to draw the mind’s attention to 
properties bodies have in common and which are experienced as present in corporeal 
images of the body’s affections [Lebuffe (2018)]. This line of interpretation may 
encourage those academics who reckon that the study of the highly imagistic 
representations of Spinoza’s philosophy found in popular, extra-academic media is 
essential for building a more fully rational view on his philosophy.  
More perplexing than the fact that we may learn something about Spinoza’s 
philosophy from what are commonly viewed as non-philosophical works is the fact that 
Spinoza garnered such popular attention in the first place. Spinoza employed a decidedly 
technical and at times belabored Latin vocabulary, his mature masterpiece is presented in 
an intimidating geometrical form, and his work is, to be sure, very difficult. None of this 
impeded his rise to popularity. Of course, any presentation of Spinoza as a popular 
philosopher is highly selective. I believe that the works I focus on here can help us 
understand the history and character of Spinoza’s role as a popular philosopher, but they 
are by no means the only works that can do this work. I use the term “popular 
philosophy” rather loosely and take it to denote any representation of Spinoza’s thinking 
in extra-academic settings or works. Additionally, a part of my analysis in this chapter 
turns on an ambiguity in the notion of “popular” as also suggesting whatever relates to 
“the people” and/or their efforts and undertakings, as a non-negligible element of 
Spinoza’s popular reception involves what are militant public-oriented applications of 
Spinoza’s political views.  
Yet a caveat is already in order. Because the nature and extent of Spinoza’s 
popularity varies from (linguistic or national) context to context, my exclusion of some 
contexts to the benefit of others means my exposition is far from exhaustive. What makes 
Spinoza resonate in one part of the world might be very dissimilar from what makes him 
resonate in another part of the world. For my part, I am interested in Anglophone and 
Francophone works. First, I view the respective contexts as attention worthy in that an 
important amount of academic and non-academic work on Spinoza has appeared and 
continues to appear in these contexts. Second, my relevant insider knowledge is restricted 
to the Anglophone and Francophone contexts and insider knowledge is essential to grasp 
what makes Spinoza “popular” in context. Neither of my reasons is meant to suggest that 
these are the most or only contexts where we can profitably analyze Spinoza and popular 
philosophy.  
Naturally, the cementing of Spinoza’s popularity belongs to a larger history of 
Spinoza’s reception. Spinoza’s role in shaping the broader course of Western philosophy 
was tremendous, such as in the context of the “radical Enlightenment” as well as in the 
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context of the development of late-eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth-century 
Germanophone philosophy [Israel (2001); Förster and Melamed (2012)]. I doubt that 
Spinoza could have become an unusually popular philosopher without having already 
been canonized or highly esteemed by his peers, though I bracket these considerations 
here. 
I organize the literature I examine chronologically. In the first section, I examine 
two late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century works on Spinoza. It was not until the 
mid-to-late nineteenth-century that the history of philosophy became a specialized field 
of research; similarly, it is only at this point that Spinoza becomes widely available in 
translation, in Elwes’ translation in the Anglophone world, for instance, and in Saisset’s 
translation in France [Laerke (forthcoming)]. The works I look to here belong to this 
period when the work of amateur expositors of Spinoza was not so distantly removed 
from professional historians. The works in question, by Jules Prat [Spinoza (1860), 
(2015), and (2016)] and Romain Rolland [Malamud (1931)], touch on two important 
themes in Spinoza’s subsequent popularization. Prat’s work involves an issue alluded to 
above, namely the militant application of Spinoza’s political philosophy. Rolland’s 
autobiographical work, on the other hand, stands out as an early figuration of Spinoza in 
the genre of self-help literature. 
In the second section, I examine the fiction of Isaac Bashevis Singer (Singer 
(1961)] and Bernard Malamud [Malamud (1966)]. Both are highly acclaimed mid-
century authors for whom Jewish culture and religion, in the Old World and the New, is a 
defining feature of their fictional worlds. The analysis of their respective works, Singer’s 
short story “The Spinoza of Market Street” and Malamud’s novel The Fixer, sheds light 
on two prominent commonplaces in Spinoza’s popular reception: the representation of 
Spinoza as a hermetic thinker who stands above the common condition, and the view of 
Spinoza as a political and religious rebel. 
In the third section, where I conclude this short survey of popular literature and 
its trends, I turn to a work which appeared within the last decade: Irvin D. Yalom’s The 
Spinoza Problem [Yalom (2012)]. I show that this work suggests an interesting second-
order issue raised by Spinoza’s role as a popular philosopher, viz., the problem of 
Spinoza’s ideal or intended audience. 
 
Section 1: Jules Prat and Romain Rolland 
Jules Prat’s (1823-1895) idiosyncratic blend of Spinozism and left-wing French 
Republicanism stands out as a historically and philosophically rich approach to Spinoza 
that has hardly been studied thus far.  It is noteworthy that at no point over the course of a 
lifetime translating Spinoza and publishing Spinoza’s works (at his own personal 
expense, no less), did Prat occupy a university chair of philosophy; Prat was a lawyer by 
training and a city administrator (director Hausmann’s Paris of the Service des 
promenades et des plantations) by profession. As his recent biographer and posthumous 
editor, Bernard Pautrat, notes, Prat is solely motivated by the belief that “Spinoza’s 
doctrine, taken seriously and treated as Spinoza himself treated it, should be a tool for the 
transformation of man and society to achieve the greatest possible freedom” [Spinoza 
(2015), 381-382]. Here I will briefly present Prat’s exposition of Spinoza as a militant 
thinker whose intention was to transform political structures affecting the broader public. 
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Prat’s attempts to propagate Spinozism are decidedly informed by the 
worrisomely weak state of French Republicanism in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century. 
He undertakes the enterprise following the collapse of the Second Republic and the rise 
to power of Napoleon III in 1852 as a faithful “member of the generation of 1848” 
[Spinoza (2015), 375]. Eminently representative of this period in his life is Prat’s 
translation (the first in French) of Spinoza’s Tractatus Politicus in 1860 [Spinoza 
(1860)]. In the same year, he publishes a translation of the appendix to Ethics Part 4 
[Spinoza (2016)], meant to serve as a vade mecum of Spinozist living for the casual 
reader. 
 Of special note in Prat’s translation of Spinoza’s TP is the detailed and lengthy 
preface, where Prat fills in the blanks on Spinoza’s behalf of what an ideal democratic 
constitution looks like. By systematically substituting the word “elector” for “patrician” 
as it appears in Spinoza’s model of the decentralized aristocratic government, we can, on 
Prat’s view, reconstruct Spinoza’s ideal democratic government. Prat argues that 
Spinoza’s ideal is, in fact, “a regime where the Patricians of intelligence and 
honorability, elected in every class of society and from any condition, by the mass of 
citizens, alone have the right, by the law, to administer affairs of state and the occupy the 
charges of the empire,” and hence, that Spinoza intended to design a bona fide 
“Aristocratic Democracy” or a “government where there is no other nobility besides that 
of virtue and intelligence” [Spinoza (1860), 33]. Hence, Prat maintains that the 
democratic state’s institutions must be designed such that children born into any family 
have equal access to education and other intelligence or virtue promoting goods.  
What follows is an elaboration of the model democracy’s institutions cast in the 
mold of populist French Republican politics; Spinoza’s ideal constitution for the people 
and the times, as it were. In a pull-out pamphlet attached to the end of his translation Prat 
divulges a kind of rubric for what the state should look like with regards to specific 
administrative matters, like taxation, nationalized banking, public instruction, agriculture, 
affairs of religion, and commerce. To give one specific example, Prat reasons that in the 
model democracy all schools must be free of charge, and because, according to Spinoza, 
“the nature of children, such as that of adults, is to be composed of one single substance, 
both body and mind, public instruction must include physical education, such that the 
Republic must join to all schools a public gymnasium” [Spinoza (1860), 339]. As Pautrat 
notes, “from rubric to rubric, we witness a rare spectacle: Spinoza, via Prat, giving birth 
to a Republican program and an awareness of the struggles that the Third Republic will 
live out” [Spinoza (2015) 389]. 
Prat’s militant Spinozist Republicanism remained rather devoid of disciples. 
However, his belief that Spinoza speaks to the people and their struggles prefigures 
recent understandings of Spinoza’s political agenda and its applicability. Consider, for 
instance, the popular work of Negri and Hardt [Negri and Hardt (2001)], for whom the 
concept of multitudo is called on to make sense of the state of the global proletariat; or 
again, the work of Lordon [Lordon (2015)], for whom the concept of imperium can 
congenially contribute to contemporary discussions of the purpose and value of sovereign 
powers. What distinguishes Prat is that he saw fit to attend to the minutiae of Spinoza’s 
political texts and to the institution building paradigms that Spinoza himself endorsed. 
In contrast to Prat, for whom Spinoza serves as a springboard for politics, we find 
the Nobel prize winning author Romain Rolland (1866-1944), for whom Spinoza serves 
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as a touchstone of self-help. I do not mean to suggest that Rolland’s elegant writing on 
Spinoza suffers from the sort of stultifying vulgarity and triviality frequently exhibited by 
self-help literature. Nonetheless, it does have the common trait of professing to find in 
Spinoza a kind of guru whose philosophy helps the author attain inner peace at a time 
when life is, he finds, extremely hard. 
In his L’éclair de Spinoza [Rolland (1931)], Rolland tells us that, like so many 
still, he discovered Spinoza in the high-school classroom, at Louis-le-Grand, though 
Spinoza was not on the national philosophy curriculum. Rather, like Spinoza himself, 
Rolland states, Descartes was the immediate impetus to discovering a way out of the 
“majestic walled garden” to “unlimited perspectives” [Rolland (1931), 114]. He had 
found Saisset’s edition of Spinoza’s works “under the galleries of Odéon”; this became 
his “elixir of eternal life,” and although Rolland professes to have now later in life “freed 
himself from the strict rationalism of the master Benoît” […] the work “remains sacred, 
equal to the Holy Books for him who believes; and I do not touch these three volumes but 
with a pious love. I will never forget that in the cyclone of my adolescence, I found my 
refuge in the profound nest of the Ethics” [Rolland (1931), 115-116].  
Rolland’s tale is meant to convey the way that Spinoza can help us to free 
ourselves, even, he says quoting a letter from a Bengalese political prisoner who read 
L’éclair de Spinoza in translation, when conditions are most restrictive [Rolland (1931), 
107-108]. What was then it about Spinoza that spoke so compelling to Rolland and that 
provided him the means to liberate himself? It was, he writes, “the words of fire,” the 
image of “the surging of the white sun of Substance” leaping through the windows of his 
cold and damp bedroom in winter, yielding “metal in fusion, which fills the depths of my 
eyes, pouring into my own being that it consumes, and my being, like a fountain, gushing 
back into the vat” [Rolland (1931), 119-120].  
Reflection on his own mystic or irrationalist interpretation, according to which 
any reader can brought into a state of fusion with Spinoza’s God, gives way in Rolland to 
a second-order observation about the value of Spinoza’s philosophical style, the more 
geometrico. He writes: “I do not pretend that this virtuous miracle is inherent in some 
magic words, nor that I had then rightly seized the true thought of Spinoza. […] In the 
traced inscriptions at the entry to the Ethics, in these Definitions in flamboyant letters, I 
decrypted, not that which he had said, but that which I wanted to say, the words of my 
own childish thought, in its inarticulate tongue, struggling to emerge. One never reads a 
book. One reads through books, either to discover oneself, or to control oneself” [Rolland 
(1931), 120-121]. It is thus not the “master of the geometrical order” or the “rationalist” 
who won him over, though these “magnificent games of reason provide deep aesthetic 
joy,” but the “realist,” and Rolland finds it regrettable that this aspect of Spinoza’s 
thought has been covered over to the point of being invisible thanks to the “heavy 
intellectual verbalism of professional philosophers” [Rolland (1931), 123-124].  
For Rolland, reading Spinoza provided him with the occasion to free him from his 
metaphorical state of mental imprisonment [Rolland (1931), 124-125]. In short, to attain 
this freedom one must approach Spinoza “not with the cold eyes of intelligence” but with 
“the passion of the heart and the ardor of the senses” [Rolland (1931), 129].  
Rolland’s discussion of the meaningfulness of Spinoza for his personal 
development is intended to draw the reader’s attention to the power provided by Spinoza 
for self-liberation. If more recent variants on this popular approach to Spinoza have 
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tended to water down what Rolland maximizes in intensity in favor of highlighting a less 
bold, self-positive attitude that Spinoza would ostensibly help us cultivate, the guiding 
intuition — that Spinoza did not seek the truth merely to have intellectual dissertations 
written about him, but to help guide each of us in our own very personal endeavors — 
does not seem any less present [Guay de Bellissen (2019); Lenoir (2017); Thomass 
(2019)]. As a matter of fact, Spinoza seems to invite such an approach in his earliest 
extant work, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (TIE). With its opening paragraphs 
tinged in autobiography, Spinoza seems to exhort us to draw on our own personal 
experiences and reflect on past mistakes when setting out on our personal path to 
enlightenment. 
 
Section 2: Isaac Bashevis Singer and Bernard Malamud 
I will now look to two mid-century fictional stories that, I imagine, many of my readers 
will have already encountered. The first of these is “The Spinoza of Market Street” by 
Isaac Bashevis Singer. In my view, it deserves the attention it has received even among 
professional historians of Early Modern philosophy [Garber 1994]. Dr. Fischelson, the 
story’s protagonist, is an avid Spinozist. He takes Spinoza, whom he would emulate, to 
admonish the emotional tumult and sociability of common folk. The twist of Singer’s 
story resides in showing that this is no good way to live and that common folk have it at 
least partly right in embracing the emotions and social relations.  
 Dr. Fischelson is a feeble older scholar whose lifetime goal was “to be as 
independent as Spinoza himself” [Singer (1961), 9]. As a result, he “had isolated himself 
completely and had become a forgotten man” [Singer (1961) 10-11]. His one companion 
is Spinoza, who he has studied for the thirty years. Dr. Fischelson’s scorn for the rabble, 
“immersed in the vainest of passions, drunk with emotions,” finds a theoretical footing in 
the alleged Spinozist teaching that emotion is never good [Singer (1961), 9]. In stark 
contrast to the rabble’s debased pursuit of pleasure, Dr. Fischelson cultivates a hobby of 
his own: stargazing. In contemplating the Milky Way, Dr. Fischelson becomes “aware of 
that infinite extension which is, according to Spinoza, one of God’s attributes.”  It 
comforts him to think that although he is “only a weak, puny man, a changing mode of 
the absolutely infinite Substance,” he is also “a part of the cosmos, made of the same 
matter as the celestial bodies.” To that extent, he is “a part of the Godhead” and he knows 
that “he cannot be destroyed” [Singer (1961) 6-7]. These moments of vertiginous 
euphoria, the experience of amor dei intellectualis, can do nothing, however, to repair his 
failing health. 
Dr. Fischelson cannot live up to the superhuman expectations set on him by 
Spinoza. One day his poor health catches up with him. Market Street’s desolation mirrors 
his own despair. Poland is engulfed in war as Imperial German troops make their way to 
Tsarist Russia. Dr. Fischelson believes his time has come. His neighbor, the spinster 
Black Dobbe, finds him near death, prostate on his bed, and yet succeeds in nurturing him 
back to life. As much a loner and outcast as he, Dobbe and Dr. Fischelson converse about 
the injustices they have suffered and ultimately recognize that what has blossomed 
between them is love. To the surprise of the community, who took both Dr. Fischelson 
and Dobbe to be lost causes, they come before the rabbi and are married. Dr. Fischelson 
has found health and happiness. He thus must ask forgiveness from Spinoza for having 
become a fool. 
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The story is a parable. Dr. Fischelson’s redemption is meant to instruct us in the 
inherent value of our this-worldly condition, along with the wisdom of surrendering to 
chance, folly, and interpersonal love. Hard rationalism coupled with a reclusive, 
Ebenezer Scrooge-esque lifestyle might yield intoxicating glimpses into Nature’s eternal 
laws, but these are no substitutes for the kind of care that can only be provided by a 
fellow human being, and that any fellow human being, even Dobbe in her declined state, 
can provide. Spinoza is seen as a proponent of an anti-social attitude and ascetic virtues 
like poverty and chastity, having fully embraced the life of the mind and turned his back 
on merely mundane matters. That this is shown to be a poor way of life is one thing, but 
what is more, Dr. Fischelson’s failure to live by Spinoza’s teachings comes to symbolize 
the impracticability of philosophy itself. As if anticipating Deleuze’s remark that Spinoza 
teaches philosophers to become non-philosophers [Deleuze (1981)], Singer’s story 
illustrates the view that no one, not even the most devoted scholar, can attain the rational 
quietus that the philosopher argues is the highest goal in life, though in practicing that 
philosophy we might still find a way out.  
A telling counter example is provided by the Spinoza of Yakov Bov, the 
protagonist of Malamud’s novel The Fixer. Malamud’s tale, like Singer’s, concerns the 
fall and eventual redemption of a Jewish man who scorns the shtetl and the petty ways of 
the community. Leaving his town to make a life for himself in Kiev, Yakov finds himself 
imprisoned and set to be tried in an instance of the anti-Semitic blood libel. Yakov turns 
to Spinoza for succor. But Yakov’s Spinoza turns out to be a revolutionary.  
This is the novel’s very conclusion. Yakov is about to stand trial and he is 
daydreaming that he meets the Tsar, discusses Russia’s regime of hate and violence, and 
assassinates him. He thinks to himself: “One thing I’ve learned […] there’s no such thing 
as an unpolitical man, especially a Jew. You can’t be one without the other, that’s clear 
enough. You can’t sit still and see yourself destroyed. […] Where there’s no fight for it 
there’s no freedom. What is it Spinoza says? If the state acts in ways that are abhorrent to 
human nature it’s the lesser evil to destroy it. Death to the anti-Semites! Long live 
revolution! Long live Liberty!” [Malamud (1966) 335]. 
This call to arms contrasts with the mid-point of the novel when the reader first 
discovers Yakov’s affinity for Spinoza. Yakov, imprisoned in Kiev, is met by the 
investigating magistrate. The magistrate notes that Yakov kept a copy of Spinoza’s works 
and a dialogue ensues. The theme of freedom is gradually brought to center stage. Yakov 
maintains that Spinoza teaches us that “Necessity binds us down,” though we can at least 
know our freedom if we know we are in God [Malamud (1966) 75-76]. The political 
implications of Spinoza’s understanding of freedom are not noticed by Yakov.  
In fact, it is the magistrate who draws Yakov’s attention to the political aspect of 
Spinoza’s thinking. He asks whether Yakov believes one can be free without being 
politically free. Yakov recognizes that he is in tricky waters and remains silent. The 
magistrate then reveals what he thinks of Spinoza: “One might say there is more than one 
conception of freedom in Spinoza’s mind — in Necessity, philosophically speaking; and 
practically, in the state, that is to say within the realm of politics and political action.” 
The magistrate further suggests that, for Spinoza, “the purpose of the state — the 
government — was the security and comparative freedom of rational man.” [Malamud 
(1966) 77-78]. It is as if the remainder of the novel shows how the Spinozist seed, planted 
by chance and then nourished by a conversation in jail, finally blossoms at the story’s 
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conclusion. Thus, we see that, for Malamud, Spinoza’s philosophy appears in its full 
glory only when its reader, radicalized by extreme conditions, takes it to license 
revolutionary political action. 
One common feature to Singer and Malamud is the way that they root their 
Spinozists in a Jewish world. In this, they are forerunners of the ongoing popular 
preoccupation with Spinoza’s own relation to Judaism [Goldstein 2006, Yalom 2012]. 
That biographical material should prove the focal point for influential popular literature 
on Spinoza is unsurprising. They diverge, however, in seeing what kind of stance 
Spinoza’s philosophy motivates with regards to our interactions with our fellow human 
beings. Though we should dispute Malamud’s suggestion that there are two conceptions 
of freedom in Spinoza, I believe we should, as exegetes, side with Malamud in 
emphasizing that Spinoza does not conceive freedom individualistically [Sharp 2019]. 
Though Spinoza maintains unequivocally that the “free man” strives to cultivate the 
intellect, Spinoza also maintains in the Ethics and especially in the political works that 
possessing intellectual virtue is necessary but not sufficient for success in cultivating 
freedom [cf. TP ch. 2, §15] Rather, freedom is such that to enjoy it we also require the 
continuous support of social relations and/or political devices: institutions, laws, etc. 
Without the latter, we cannot achieve the basic security necessary for any life, much less 
a rational one. 
 
Section 3: Irvin D. Yalom 
To conclude my survey of prominent trends in popular literature on Spinoza, I now 
briefly turn now to a recent (and very commercially successful) book of historical semi-
fiction: Irvin D. Yalom’s The Spinoza Problem. Yalom presents the work as a “novel of 
ideas” and a way to celebrate Spinoza’s contributions — namely, that “ideas, thoughts, 
and feelings are caused by previous experiences, that passions may be studied 
dispassionately, that understanding leads to transcendence” — to psychiatry and 
psychotherapy [Yalom (2012) 7-8]. Yalom’s novel contains two stories in one: the story 
of Spinoza’s “inner life” from the cherem of 1656 until 1666, and the story of Alfred 
Rosenberg, Nazi ideologue, and his own personal interest in Spinoza. According to 
Yalom, the events contained in the novel “could have happened”; to facilitate an access 
to the psyche of the protagonists [Spinoza and Rosenberg], two fictional figures are 
introduced: Franco Benitez and Friedrich Pfister. 
 There is not much to say about Yalom’s representation of Spinoza’s philosophy, 
which is evoked as a sort of Jewish Enlightenment-era humanism. Let us grant that the 
Spinoza of Yalom’s novel overlaps at least in part with Spinoza the philosopher. What is 
rather more interesting is the way that Yalom’s Spinoza poses an intriguing “problem” 
for the would-be reader of Spinoza. In turn, this problem-posing feature of Spinoza’s 
thought gives way to an important second-order issue involved in the study of Spinoza as 
a popular thinker, viz., the question of ascertaining Spinoza’s ideal audience. To be clear, 
it seems to be that there are at least three Spinoza problems. The first is the problem that 
Spinoza himself ostensibly posed to the Jewish community of Amsterdam. The second is 
the problem that Spinoza represented to the eyes of an avowed anti-Semite who, despite 
himself, continued to return to Spinoza’s thinking. The last, and most interesting, is the 
broader problem of Spinoza’s ideal or intended readership. 
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 It might be thought, this appears to be Yalom’s intuition, that Spinoza’s Ethics, 
with its alleged psychotherapeutic remedies, is most congenially read by a person who 
suffers the ailments that Spinoza hopes to remedy. But herein lies the problem. If the 
reader is deeply mired in the passions and inadequate ideas, how can they be reasonably 
expected to get themselves out of that mire of passions, even with Spinoza’s help? Take 
the case of Rosenberg, as Yalom relays it. Through his studies of Goethe, Rosenberg 
recognizes that he may find in Spinoza something of genuine value for remedying his 
own inner turmoil and outward-directed rage. The Nazi recognizes that it is “this view of 
an orderly universe with predictable, mathematically derived laws, a world with an 
infinite explanatory power, that offered Goethe a sense of calmness.” Out of impatience 
and intolerance, however, Rosenberg cannot stand to read the first few pages of the 
Ethics. Rosenberg “wants what Goethe got out of Spinoza” but “feels only dread this 
natural orderliness” [Yalom (2012) 420-421]. In Spinoza’s terms, we have here a case of 
the fluctuatio animi [3p17s]. Yalom’s story thus serves to suggest that the reader in 
theory who Spinoza would be in a position to do the most for — the reader who is the 
most encumbered by the passions and least guided by reason — is the very reader who is 
least within the grasp the Spinozist psychotherapeutic project, whereas the reader already 
guided by reason and thus able to practice Spinozism is the reader who needs Spinoza the 
least.  
It is fitting, I believe, to conclude this discussion of the ever-growing popular 
literature on Spinoza on an open-ended note. My survey of several popular 
representations, applications, and appreciations of Spinoza may well indicate that the 
public for whom Spinoza writes is very elusive indeed, though not so much because of its 
having too many inadequate ideas, but rather because the public has yet to settle on which 
‘Spinoza’ it is they prefer. Or perhaps, as Deleuze long ago said, it is that we 
philosophers have not yet learned all there is to learn about Spinoza from the non-
philosophers, the genuine Spinozists (Deleuze 1981). Spinoza, after all, did not write 
philosophy as a mere livelihood. He was not a “professional philosopher”. His income 
was very modest, but he prided himself on being freed from the constraints of a 
university position and declined the offer when it presented itself. He did philosophy 
because he thought that what was at stake in philosophy was human blessedness itself. I 
cannot imagine he would think his works the privilege of any one community of readers 
whether artists, novelists, poets, or philosophers.  
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